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THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
THE Investment Company Act of 19401 is the newest comprehensive piece
of national legislation drawn in the "interest of investors" and entrusted
for administration to the Securities and Exchange Commission. That its
passage was achieved with the complete cooperation of the industry2 adds sig-
nificance to the Act, whether it be considered purely as a much needed
regulatory measure in that particular industry, or whether it be considered
as suggesting the temper of any further federal legislation supervising cor-
porations.
Essentially, investment companies are large, liquid pools of public savings
entrusted to the company management for investment in productive enter-
prise. Normally they invest for the yield, including capital appreciation,3 and
1. Pub. L. No. 768, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Aug. 22, 1940). The Act is divided into
three titles of which Title I is addressed to investment companies and is separately
known as the Investment Company Act of 1940. Except where otherwise indicated, this
Comment is restricted to Title I. Title II regulates investment advisers. Title III amends
§ 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77 (1934).
2. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Conmmerce of the House of Representatives on H. R. 10065, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)
62, 63.
3. Capital gains are treated as income by most investment companies, and are so
regarded for income tax purposes. INT. REv. CODE, § 22(a), Reg. § 19.22(a)-19 (1936).
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not for the control of productive wealth -a feature which distinguishes them
from holding companies. Shareholders are induced to purchase investment
company securities by the prospect of obtaining a diversification and expert
management of their investments which, as individuals, they could not afford
to command. Frequently the sales and promotional literature of these corn-
panies, by stressing the necessity of providing for old age and emergencies,
has analogized them to banks and insurance companies, except that they are
not limited to so-called "legal" investments.4 In organization and practice
they have assumed an almost infinite variety of forms. Among the principal
differentiating factors are the nature of their legal organization, the amount
of discretion left in management to change the composition of the portfolio,
capital structure, investment policy, security-marketing policy, and the desig-
nation as "open-end" or "dosed-end." An open-end company is one whose
shares are redeemable at a figure roughly comparable to their proportional
share of the underlying assets of the company.5 To avoid a constant shrinkage
of its funds, this type of company is constantly selling as well as redeeming
its shares, and is therefore closely geared to security-distributing machinery.
Closed-end companies are those without this redemptive feature.
Born in boom times,0 weaned upon the 1929 crash, and plagued with a
fringe of thoroughly dishonest manipulators, the investment company industry
grew without any effective regulation, 7 internal or external, to reap the
whirlwind. Of course there were many substantial and successful companies,
but the picture presented by the Securities and Exchange Commission after
a four-year investigation 8 showed fantastic abuse of trust by management and
wholesale victimizing of investment company security holders." In general
4. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMISSI0N ON hESTMENT TnusTs
AND INVSTME NT COMPANIFS (1939) Pt. I, c. 3, p. 60, 61. (Hereafter cited as SEC
REPoRT).
5. The official definition in the Act is "a management company which is offering
for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the issuer." § 5(a) (1).
6. Out of 1200 investment companies whose dates of organization are known, ap-
proximately one-half were organized in 1927-1929. Total assets of all investment com-
panies increased ten-fold to almost $8,000,000,000 from the end of 1926 to the crash in
1929. SEC REPORT, Pt. III, c. 1, p. 3-4.
7. For the inadequacy of the common law to protect investment company share-
holders, see Comment (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 117. For a summary of applicable state
and federal legislation prior to 1937 and its inadequacies, see Comment (1937) 46 YA.n
L. J. 1211, 1217 et seq.
8. In § 30 of the Holding Company Act, the SEC was directed in broadest possible
terms to study the functions and activities of investment companies and to report back
to Congress. 49 STAT. 837 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79z-4 (Supp. 1939). The material for
the study was collected by means of specially prepared questionnaires, preliminary dis-
cussions and conferences with representatives of investment trusts, field studies, and
public examinations. SEC REPORT, Pt. I, c. 1, p. 5 et scq.
9. SEC officials estimate that between 1929 and 1936 investors suffered an aggre-
gate capital shrinkage of approximately 40% in all types of investment companies. Hear-
ings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S.
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the abuses stemmed from the control of investment companies by banking,
brokerage, or dealer interests- a control founded in complicated capital
structures, disguised behind meagre, and often misleading, reports to stock-
holders, and exercised to benefit the sponsor without regard to any steward-
ship on behalf of the investors who put up the money.
Severe criticism of the industry, both from within and from without, had
not awaited the publication of the SEC report. 10 Various types of moderate
reform were attempted, such as a vigorous enforcement of anti-fraud legis-
lation in New York," the self-regulation of the industry under an "NRA
code,' 2 and the adoption of fairly comprehensive disclosure requirements by
various important security-distributing states.' 3 Extremists went so far as to
suggest that the whole investment company industry was a parasite upon the
stream of industrial earnings, levying tolls upon the yield of blue-chip securities
to pay administration costs and income taxes that were not economically
justified.1 4
While it was never seriously proposed to outlaw investment companies
entirely, the original bill for federal regulation, submitted by the SEC to
Congress last March, surpassed even the Holding Company Act in grants
of discretionary power to the Commission.'5 Whether it would have been
politically possible to pass the bill in its original form is questionable. At
any rate, the present Act is a drastic modification, rewritten entirely by the
Commission and the industry, and passed by Congress without debate as a
tribute to the cooperative spirit which fathered it.16 Where the original draft
left the Commission with power by rule and regulation to implement the
broad policies of the bill, the present Act generally sets certain maxima of
3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) Pt. I, p. 34; Pt. II, p. 783. (Hereinafter cited as
Hearings).
10. FOWLER, AMERICAN INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1928); RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND
WALL STREET (1928); WILLIS and BOGEN, INVESTMENT BANKING (1929) 183; Cabot,
The Investment Trust (March 1939) 163 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 473; Comment, Statutory
Regulation of Investment Trusts (1939) 44 HARv. L. REV. 117.
11. For the failure of this type of control see Ottinger and Shea, A Survey of the
Activities and Forms of Investment Trusts with Recommendations for Statutory Regu-
lation by the New York State Department of Law (1927).
12. Article VIII of the proposed Code of Fair Competition for Investment Bankers
outlawed self-dealing and required full disclosure to stockholders of investment com-
panies. Hearings, Pt. II, p. 641.
13. Ohio's famous "Q-3" regulation of open-end security distribution was adopted
by the National Association of Securities Commissioners in 1939 as a guide to the en-
forcement of "Blue Sky" legislation in all states. Hearings, Pt. II, p. 548.
14. The two best critiques of the investment company institution, written in contem-
plation of its introduction into France, analyze and refute this argument. CUAINON,
SOCIETES DE PLACEMENT ET SOCIETES DE CONTROLE (Lyon, 1932) 222; ScuwoD, LEs
"INVESTMENT TRUSTS" Aux ETATS-UNIS (Paris, 1934) 151. See also FLYNN, INVEST-
MENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG (1931) 179.
15. This original bill was S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
16. 86 CONG. REc., Aug. 13, 1940, at 15691.
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regulation, leaving in the Commission a discretionary power only to exempt
and minimize.
17
The method of regulation varies with different sections of tile Act - the
whole being a compound of disclosure requirements, insurance of at least
a minimum voting control by stockholders on key questions, and direct pro-
hibition of certain practices which are either themselves fraudulent or serious
temptations to fraud. 18 Although the role of the Commission is ostensibly
little more than that of a watch-dog, with power to enforce the Act by stop-
order, injunction, and criminal prosecution, it seems likely that the Com-
mission will exercise considerably greater power by way of persuasion than
a literal reading of the Act would imply.19 This Comment will attempt to
specify and illustrate the observations advanced above, treating the signifi-
cant sections of the Act in groups according to the general problem with
which they deal.
Definitions, Classificalions, Registraiion. Under penalty of exclusion from
all channels of interstate commerce,20 investment companies are required to
register with the SEC, after which a company is subject to all other pro-
visions of the Act.21 Therefore, to appreciate the scope of this legislation
it is necessary to inquire, first, how the term "investment company" is defined,
and, secondly, how this heterogeneous group is sub-classified for particular
treatment.
The basic definition of "investment company" in Section 3(a) includes
a functional and a formulaic test: it catches those companies which "are or
hold themselves out to be engaged primarily" in the investment business,
and also those companies 40% of whose assets are in investment securities.
So broad a definition is quite necessary to cover the case of fixed trusts and
other non-trading investment companies, but it would, unless qualified, in-
clude holding companies, underwriting companies, banks, and other insti-
tutions, for whose benefit a lengthy list of exceptions to the definition had
17. For instance, § 30 of the present Act permits the Commission to eliminate from
but not add to the list of periodic reports required of an investment company. Cf. § 14
of the Holding Company Act which, vithin broad limits, permits the Commission to de-
termine the form and content of comparable reports by holding companies. 49 ST.T. 27
(1935), 15 U. S. C. §79n (Supp. 1939). Such a comparison could be made with many
sections of the two Acts.
18. Sections 19 on dividends and 25 on reorganizations are typical disclosure sec-
tions. Sections 13 and 18 illustrate the stockholder control theory. And §§ 9, 10, and
12 contain many of the direct prohibitions.
19. See note 70 infra.
20. § 7. This includes the mails and facilities of national securities exchanges regis-
tered under the 1934 Act and applies to transactions in the company's own securities as
well as to the carrying on of the investment business. For a collection of authorities sup-
porting the constitutionality of such sanctions, see Securities & Exch. Comm. v. Jones,
12 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
21. Section 8 is the registration section. Other sections of the Act apply to "regis-
tered investment companies!'
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to ,be drawn.2 2 In spite of this complexity, or perhaps because of it, the Section
appears to have brought under the Act all and only those companies which
were supposed to be covered.
23
Registered investment companies are divided into three principal classes.
"Face-amount certificate companies," which sell unsecured debentures upon
the installment plan, and "unit investment trusts," which sell aliquot shares
in a fixed or semi-fixed bundle of securities deposited with a trustee, are
highly specialized types for which special regulation is provided. It is with
the remaining classification, the "management investment companies," that
the Act is principally concerned.
24
Management companies again are classified two ways: (a) open and closed
end companies, and (b) diversified and non-diversified companies. 2r A diver-
sified company is one which meets certain statistical requirements for a
diversified portfolio.2 6 The most important registration and disclosure re-
quirements depend upon this scheme of classification.
Disclosure. One of the greatest abuses of investment company practice
had been the rapidity and irresponsibility with which some managements
totally changed the nature of their business. Stockholders who had invested
in self-styled diversified companies were committed overnight to highly
illiquid positions in banks, barge-lines, transportation, manufacturing, or any
22. Subsection (b) exempts from § 3(a) those companies which are primarily en-
gaged in other business through wholly owned subsidiaries and those which the Com-
mission finds to be so engaged through majority owned subsidiaries or controlled com-
panies, notwithstanding the 40% test. Other companies specifically declared outside the
basic definition are issuers having less than 100 security-holders, underwriters, banks,
insurance companies, trustees, companies subject to regulation under the Interstate Com-
merce or Holding Company Acts, eleemosynary institutions, and the like. § 3(c) (1-15).
23. The formula was tested against a list of 1800 companies registered under the
1933 and 1934 Acts. Hearings, Pt. I, p. 176-177. Section 6 also exempts various par-
ticular types of investment companies and gives the Commission power to make any
further exemptions consistent with the general purpose of the act. Compare the similar
power granted by § 3(d) of the Holding Company Act. 49 STAT. 810 (1935) 15 U. S. C.
§ 79c(d) (Supp. 1939).
24. §4.
25. § 5. It is not the policy of the Act to encourage any one type of company, much
less to prohibit the operation of any type. So long as a company tells its stockholders
honestly what it proposes to do, it is free to pursue its own portfolio policy. Compare
§ 586 of the recent Australian Investment Company Act, which sets rigid standards of
portfolio diversification to which all investment companies must conform.
26. Section 5(b) (1): "'Diversified company' means a management company which
meets the following requirements: At least 75 per centum of the value of its total assets
is represented by cash and cash items (including receivables), Government securities,
securities of other investment companies, and other securities for the purposes of this
calculation limited in respect of any one issuer to an amount not greater in value than 5
per centum of the value of the total assets of such management company and to not more
than 10 per centum of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer."
This gives the diversified company a reservoir of 25% of its assets for investment in
underwritings or special situations without conforming to the 5%-10% restrictions.
[Vol. 50: 4404-44
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other business which caught the managerial fancy.27 It was originally thought
by the SEC that this abuse could best be eradicated at the source, by clean-
ing up investment company charters and limiting their corporate power to
the investment business. This, however, would have worked a hardship
upon such socially useful companies as Atlas, for instance, which supply
large amounts of equity capital to growing industry, and which, for their
own protection, must be able to step in and manage a bad investment.2s
As a compromise solution, Section 8 of the present Act requires each
company to make certain "recitations of policy" in its registration statement
and to adhere to these policies until a change is authorized by vote of the
stockholders pursuant to Section 13. Declarations are required as to the
classification and subclassification in which a registrant proposes to operate;
also as to borrowing, issuing senior securities, underwriting, concentrating
investments in a particular field, commodity and real estate purchases, loans,
portfolio turnover, and any other matters which the registrant elects to treat
as "matters of fundamental policy." He may indicate the extent to which
he proposes to engage in these activities or the extent to which he reserves
freedom of action. 29 If the Commission does not permit these recitations to
become conventionalized, and therefore meaningless, they should give stock-
holders reasonable warning of, and control over, fundamental shifts in com-
pany policy without incurring the dangers of rigidity and standardization to
which government control of business policy is subject.
Apart from these policy declarations, the registration of an investment
company will require about the same type of disclosure as the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, with appropriate
provision for avoidance of duplicate filings under the various Acts.?, Regis-
tration statements must be kept up to date with periodical reports to the
27. Most spectacular was General Investment Company's sudden acquisition of a
$70,000,000 subway in Buenos Aires which tied up practically all of its assets and w,,as
later sold for about 10% of its cost. Hcarings, Pt. I, p. 121, 127. Other instances vhere
large sums were similarly lost abound in the history of Goldman Sachs, Phoenix Securi-
ties, and the Founder's Group. See SEC REPORT, Part III, passim.
28. Agitation for a federal incorporation act as the only practical means of correct-
ing state laxity continues, however. Bills to this effect were introduced three times in
Congress in the last two years-S. 330, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), S. 10, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1938), S. 3072, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The SEC has concluded that
federpi incorporation of interstate corporations is desirable. SEC REFo.r 0:. TUK STUDY
AND INVESTIGATION OF VORK, ACrITIES, PERSOT.M-L, AND Fu 'zO.s OF Prornnvs
AND REORGANIZATIO COn MF.mS (1938) Pt. VII, 412.
29. Section 8(b)(1) and (2) sets forth the registration requirements. Section 13
requires approval by a majority of voting securities for any deviations therefrom except
for portfolio turnover and for a shift from the unrestricted classification "non-diversified"
to the restricted "diversified" classification. These exceptions avoid hamstringing manage-
ment initiative in time of crisis when liquidation of special situations may be urgently
required and would involve exceeding the expected rate of portfolio turnover or qualify-
ing as a diversified company through temporary reinvestment in blue chips.
30. §§ 8(c) and 24.
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Commission and to stockholders, the maximum requirements of which are
set forth in Section 30.81
In this connection it is noteworthy that the Commission is granted one
very important discretionary power- that of prescribing a "reasonable
degree of uniformity" in accounting practice, both for the purpose of reports
under Section 30 and for the maintenance of the complete financial records
required to be kept by Section 31.32 Owing to the liquid nature of most
investment company assets, and their hour-to-hour revaluation upon the
market, accounting precedents from industrial companies are of limited appli-
cation. The Commission has indicated that an entirely different set of ac-
counting rules from those effective under the earlier Acts will be promulgated.
Inasmuch as these rules have not appeared, it is possible only to state that
the principal problems involved will be those of defining a capital impair-
ment, the treatment of unrealized profit and loss, and some modification of
the usual distinction between fixed and current assets which seems inappli-
cable to an investment company balance sheet.3 3 In addition to their dis-
closure value, these rules will manifestly affect an evaluation of certain other
sections, notably those on dividends, reorganization, and capital structure.
All of these disclosure provisions are designed as much to safeguard the
potential purchaser of investment securities as the individual who is already a
stockholder. The security factory of the past, with its high-pressure sales-
manship and alluring advertisements, will find operation more difficult when
all of its sales literature, as well as the official prospectus, must, under
Section 24, pass muster for truth and fairness with the Commission. 4
Personnel and Self-Dealing Provisions. Four sections of the Act directly
attack the most obvious single weakness in former investment company
practice-the complete lack of uniform provision for insuring the indepen-
dence of management and its fidelity to its own stockholders. Section 9 dis-
qualifies for management positions known criminals, including those under
injunction in connection with any security transaction. 35 Section 10 provides
31. See note 17 supra.
32. §31(c).
33. See ROBINSON, INVESTMENT TRUST ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE (rev. ed. 1929)
Ch. 17, and statement of chief SEC accountant before Senate Sub-committee, HEARINGS,
Pt. II, p. 906 (summary of special accounting problems in this field) ; Statement on In-
vestment Trusts of the Management Type by the Committee on Stock Listing of the
New York Stock Exchange (1931) (various desiderata which the SEC may use as
guides); Kaplan and Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the SEC (1939)
48 YALE L. J. 935.
34. To the safeguards already surrounding the promotion of new companies by rea-
son of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 [48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15
U. S. C. § 77 (1934)] is now added § 14, which requires that new investment companies
have a net worth of $100,000 before offering securities to the public, an effective dis-
couragement to the shoestring security peddler.
35. This is a flat prohibition qualified by an exemptive power in the Commission.
The original draft of the section, which required all investment company officers and
[Vol. SO: 440
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for an independent board of directors and independent investment advice.
Section 16 prevents sale of control and transfer of directorships without stock-
holder consent. And Section 17 outlaws self-dealing transactions between
individual members of management and the company itself.
In connection with Sections 9 and 16 there ought not be much adminis-
trative difficulty. The question has arisen whether an injunction running
against "The X Co. and its officers" serves to disqualify an individual who
was an officer at the time of the injunction but is such no longer, or an in-
dividual who was not an officer at the time of the injunction but has since
become one.3 6 Whatever the decisioln, the Commission has ample exemptive
discretion to avoid undue hardship for innocent parties. Section 16, which
prohibits interim appointment of directors unless two thirds of the resulting
board will have been elected by the stockholders, is salutary insurance against
a repetition of such scandals as the sale of control of Continental Securities
Co. in 1937 to freebooters who arranged a seriatim resignation of the old
directors, elected their own nominees to the board, and then raided the port-
folio of their acquired company to reimburse themselves for the expense of
purchasing it.37
Sections 10 and 17 deal with the problem of managerial responsibility in
the broadest sense and, as a result of combining at least two distinct theories,
are excessively complicated. It was suggested during the hearings on the
original bill that this whole problem could be solved most expeditiously by
declaring investment company managements to be trustees in fact with trustee
obligations to their stockholders.38 This proposal, however, which would have
involved a drastic revision of managerial responsibility, was rejected except
to the extent that "gross abuse of trust" was made a ground for restraining
the guilty party from further connection with the industry.3 0
A second theory proposed to guarantee the independence of management
from any "outside" domination and let the self-interest of ann's-length bar-
gaining regulate management. A third theory proposed to outlaw specific
transactions or types of transactions where ex-perience had shown the danger
directors to register as individuals with the SEC and become subject to such disqualifi-
cation as that body should propose drew a storm of protest from the industry. Hearings,
Pt. II, pp. 387, 411. The metamorphosis again illustrates the specification of standards
in the final draft of this Act and the limitation of SEC discretion to exemptions.
36. § 9(a)(2). Subsection (b) directs the Commission to exempt by order any
person for whom this incapacitation would be "unduly severe."
37. Hearings, Pt. I, p. 59. SEC REtoRt, Pt. III, c. 2, p. 371
Section 16 has the incidental effect of preventing the future formation of investment
companies under a common law or Massachusetts trust agreement. Only trusts already
existing are exempt from the requirement that shareholders elect their own directors.
Such election avoids the limited liability without which these trusts would not b2 formed.
Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355 (1913).
38. Hearings, Pt. I, p. 262.
39. § 36.
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of double-dealing. In general Section 10 is based upon the second theory,
and Section 17 upon the third.
Section 10 requires that when a liaison exists between an investment com-
pany and a broker, underwriter, or other outside interest, a certain percentage
of the investment company directors must be entirely independent of, and
uncontrolled by, that interest. 40 A conflict of loyalties fatal to the "inde-
pendence" of any individual arises when that individual is a director, officer,
or employee of an investment company and at the same time an "affiliated
person" of the brokerage, underwriting, or other such firm with which the
investment company deals. Depending upon which of these types of conflict
is envisaged, the required percentage of independent directors varies. Thus
only 40%o need be independent of the investment advisor as a check upon
the advice given,41 but a majority must be independent of the regular company
broker or underwriter, since these are the parties in whose self-interest it is
most directly profitable to mis-use investment company control.42 If there
/ is an investment banker on the board of an investment company, a majority
of that board must be completely independent of any (not merely the par-
ticular) investment banker- a compromise of the original SEC intention
to require complete divorcement of the industry and investment banking.43
The one obvious omission from this section, a ban on interlocking directorships
between investment companies and portfolio companies, 44 is the less impor-
tant since Section 17 forecloses the principal contemplated abuse by regulating
the sale of securities between these companies so long as the interlocking
situation continues.
The foregoing requirements apply to existing as well as to newly-formed
companies and will result in a big shake-up in substantial institutions such
as the Lehman Corporation, for instance, all of whose directors are connected
with Lehman Brothers. In most cases it was practically impossible to separate
the sheep from the goats, although there is justice in the argument that in-
vestors should be permitted to invest in a company controlled by reputable
bankers. 45 In a few cases it was thought feasible to provide exceptions
designed to save sound existing situations not conforming to the general
rule. Subsection (b) of Section 10, for instance, elaborately defines and
40. Similar restrictions apply to the "advisory board" of the investment company if
one exists distinct from the board of directors [§ 10(g)], and with appropriate modifica-
tions, to the depositor of a fixed trust. § 10(f).
41. § 10(a).
42. § 10(b) (1) and (2).
43. § 10(b) (3).
44. Section 10(e) of the original draft contained such a provision but was deleted
in view of the excessive disqualifications of present investment company directors which
it would entail.
45. Vice-President Bunker of the Lehman Corporation, testifying before the Senate
Subcommittee, argued that it was as undesirable to deprive investors of their freely chosen
managements by legislative action as by sale of control, which § 16 forbids. Hearings,
Pt. II, pp. 399, 415 et seq.
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authorizes such a set-up as that of the two open-end trusts managed by
Scudder, Stevens, and Clark as auxiliaries to their investment advisory
business. No sales load is imposed, and no sales or promotional expenses
are involved. Shareholders are all clients of the sponsoring firm.
While Section 10 deals with personnel, Section 17 deals generally with
transactions, either forbidding or regulating "self-dealing" by members of
investment company management. It is directed at a rather cruder type of
peculation which has long been outlawed in the charter or by-laws of the
best existing companies. It provides, with a few carefully phrased excep-
tions, that an affiliate or an affiliate of an affiliate of an investment company
must not knowingly sell to or buy from the company.40 The Commissiun
may by order exempt a proposed transaction from these prohibitions, but
the whole legislative history and general spirit of the Act make it evident
that, for the present at least, ordinary self-dealing transactions cannot claim
this exemption merely because the terms of the transaction are "fair." 7
Complementary paragraphs of Section 17 cover other self-dealing situa-
tions than direct sale or purchase. The Commission is authorized to regulate
joint transactions undertaken by an investment company and its affiliates;4"
the commissions of affiliates acting as brokers are limited ;4 and provision
is made for the physical safe-keeping of the portfolior ° and for the bonding
of appropriate officials.r 1
It is a commentary upon the condition of the industry prior to this Act
that Section 17 concludes by nullifying all exculpatory clauses which purpurt
to excuse management from "wilful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence,
or reckless disregard of the duties involved in the conduct of [their]
office[ !]" 52
Capital Structure. For a variety of reasons it has been argued that in-
vestment companies have no business issuing senior securities. Such preferred
stocks and bonds do not serve the economic capital-raising function of in-
dustrial issues, but more closely resemble a broker's loan to a speculating
customer,53 except that the broker retains the right to sell out the customer
46. Somewhat less strict is the National Banking Act which permits such transac-
tions between member banks and their directors if authorized by an affirmative vote of
the uninterested directors. 40 STAT. 970 (1918), 12 U. S. C. § 375 (1934).
47. Private communication to the YA, n L.,w JouiuN. from Mr. David Schener,




51. § 17(g). The original draft allowed the SEC to require that any director be
bonded. Some discretion is still left, but an attempt has been made to limit it to those
individuals having physical control of the portfolio.
52. §17(h) and (i).
53. It seems somewhat inconsistent to permit unrestricted borrowing by investment
companies and at the same time restrict broker's loans as is done by Fed. Reserve Bd.
Reg. U. (1936), issued pursuant to 48 STAT. 886 (1934), as amended by 49 STAT. 704
(1935), 15 U. S. C. § 78g (Supp. 1939). Both encourage speculation in securities.
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whereas the senior security-holder has no such recourse against the common
stockholder who controls his money. Senior securities contradict the theory
of mutuality of risk and return, which is a popular element in the investment
company apologia.5 4 They make pyramiding of control of other people's
money possible. 55 They give a false impression of being prime liens on
productive wealth, whereas the bond of an investment company is no safer
than the common stocks in its portfolio -very much a junior security in
the whole economic system. When issued, as has often been the case, to the
extent of many times the common stock, the leverage thus created makes
the common stock dangerously volatile, and tends to impose a speculative
policy upon the whole company which that common stock controls.50 And
finally, though economists disagree upon the exact figures, these senior
securities appear to have failed to meet the pragmatic test of earning their
own keep in American investment company experience -that is, the average
net cost of servicing senior securities has exceeded the average net yield
of investment company assets, so that profits from capital appreciation were
essential to continued solvency., 7
Against these views the leverage companies urged the privilege of in-
vestors, if they wish, to exchange the possibility of larger returns for the
security of a common stock cushion behind their senior capital. In the
absence of fraud, it was said, law should not usurp the place of private
business judgment. The theoretical argument was made that volatility of
investment company common stock would result as surely from a specula-
tive portfolio policy as from a high leverage ratio in the capital structure,
and there was ample evidence to show that a soundly managed leverage
company could be much less speculative in character than a badly managed
non-leverage company.5 s
The original draft of Section 18, dealing with capital structure, would
have completely banned the future issuance of senior securities, and, without
54. SEC REPORT, Pt. I, pp. 60-62; Pt. III, c. 5, p. 27.
55. See generally SEC REPORT, Pt. III, c. 4 for a running account, and SEC RE-
PORT, Pt. II, c. 5, p. 398 et seq. for statistical summaries.
56. SEC REPORT, Pt. III, c. 5, p. 120.
57. American management investment companies over the period 1930-1936 earned
an average annual gross current income of between 4Y2% and 5% of their total assets.
Deducting expenses of operation and income taxes, which averaged 20% and 3%1 respect-
ively of gross income, the resultant net earnings rate was not much over 33129o on the
average. This rate is obviously far below the net cost of senior securities since invest-
ment companies commonly sold debentures to yield between 5% and 6% at issue price
while their preferred stocks were issued at yields between 5% and 7% not counting
underwriting costs. SEC REPORT, Pt. III, c. 5, p. 21.
58. Common stock stands both to gain more and lose more the greater the amount
of senior capital related to it and earning a fixed return. While this leverage may be
built into any corporate structure, an investment company can secure it in two ways:
by purchasing leverage stocks for the portfolio, and by putting senior money into the
capital structure of the company itself. The advantage of the first method is that the
leverage ratio may be more easily altered to fit market conditions.
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going as far as the full-fledged "death sentence" clause of the Holding Com-
pany Act,59 would have permitted the Commission to enforce an "equitable
redistribution of voting rights" in existing companies. On its face, the present
section represents a considerable retreat from that position, since existing
situations are left untouched,60 and future authorization is given for closed-
end companies to issue debentures to the extent of one third of their assets
and preferred stock to the extent of one half their assets, provided that the
total of sen'or securities does not exceed 50%.61 In the case of debentures,
provision must be made in the alternative for an unusually mild touch-off or
for transfer of voting control to bondholders upon certain contingencies.
Similar appropriate protective restrictions are imposed upon preferred stocks,
and in both cases the initially established asset coverage12 must be main-
tained before common dividends are declared.03
As a practical matter, however, and without casting aspersions on existing
leverage companies through a blanket prohibition of senior securities for the
future, this section has tactfully accomplished such a ban, at least for the
immediate future. No closed-end companies have been organized since 1930.
The preferred stocks of most, if not all, closed-end leverage companies are
selling at substantial discounts below asset value on the market today.
C4
Consequently, there is no strictly economic motive for attempting to sell
more of such securities. And it is evident that other parts of the Act spoil
the game for the predatory promoter whose motive is not sound business
so much as the desire of controlling to his private advantage a large, liquid
fund. In the case of open-end companies, the future issue of senior securities
is explicitly forbidden, since it is obvious that, where the common shares
are redeemable, so-called "senior" issues are a complete anomaly.1
59. 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79k (Supp. 1939).
60. § 18(e).
61. Section 18(a) (1) contains the rules for debentures and § 18(a) (2) those for
preferred stock.
62. "Asset coverage" of bonds means the ratio which the value of the total assets of
the company, less all liabilities, and indebtedness not represented by senior securities,
bears to the aggregate amount of bonds. An asset coverage of 300% on bonds must be
maintained before payment of common dividends and 200% before pa nent of preferred
dividends.
Asset coverage of preferred stock means the ratio which the value of the total assets
of the company, less all liabilities and indebtedness not represented by senior securities,
bears to the aggregate amount of bonds plus the aggregate involuntary liquidation prefer-
ence of the preferred stock An asset coverage of 200%7o must be maintained to allow
common dividends. § 18(h).
63. In keeping with the general intent of the Act to maintain control of invebtment
companies in the hands of those who profit directly and to avoid control by various in-
directly profiting interests, companies may not issue stock warrants running over 120
days and must distribute such equally and ratably to a whole class of security holders.
§ 18(d).
64. REaoRr, Pt. II, c. 3, pp. 112-115. Hcarings, Pt. I, p. 273.
65. § 18(f). Lest the restrictions on creation of leverage through senior security
issues be circumvented by bank borrowings, appropriate limitations on bank loans to
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Dividends. The dividend section of the Act 6 underwent a like metamor-
phosis in the process of re-drafting and emerged in very much weaker form,
though here again somewhat more power was retained than appears from
a literal reading. Originally it forbade dividends upon any stock unless
prescribed asset coverages were maintained for the senior securities -these
ranging, at the discretion of the Commission, from a low of 150% for pre-
ferred stock to a high of 400%o for debentures. In retrospect this seems a
strangely rigid proposal which, in the case of companies having large un-
realized capital losses, would work a hardship upon the very group it was
designed to protect, by making all dividends impossible and encouraging
common stockholders to speculation to recoup their position. The only alter-
native was to vest discretionary control of dividends in the Commission.
But the exercise of a similar control under the Holding Company Act had
just thrown the Associated Gas system into the wringer of reorganization
and that alternative was, rightly or wrongly, regarded with suspicion.07 At
any rate, the original regulation was rejected and, no acceptable substitute
being found, none was written into the final Act.
Section 19 as first drafted had also forbidden dividends from any source
other than aggregate undistributed net income from interest and dividends,
unless expressly authorized by the company charter or by a majority of
the voting securities. This, too, has been altered to require merely that a
written statement accompany dividends from any source other than net in-
come exclusive of capital gains and losses.08
Although the elimination of Section 18(d) and the emasculation of Section
19 have left serious breaches in the protection which the Act offers to holders
of existing senior securities, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Com-
mission has no regulatory power over dividends. Outrageous cases, par-
ticularly those where dividends have been improperly declared upon stock
owned by directors, can be punished by injunctive or criminal proceedings
at the instance of the Commission. 9 And it would seem that the mere threat
of such action, coupled with the power of the Commission to prescribe ac-
investment companies are contained in § 18(g) (closed-end companies) and § 18(f)
(open-end compaties). See also note 53 supra.
66. § 19.
67. In the Matter of Associated Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Re-
lease No. 1873, Jan. 10, 1940.
68. Some state corporation statutes go farther than § 19 and are specifically saved
by § 50. Illinois prohibits common dividends from paid-in surplus, for instance. ILL. Bus.
CoRp. Acr (1933) §41.
69. Section 36 permits the Commission to proceed in the federal courts against any
member of management guilty of "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" and to seek
a permanent injunction against further participation by such individual in the industry.
Section 49 fixes criminal penalties, enforceable at the instance of the Attorney-General,
for violation of the Act or afiy rule made in accordance with it. There is no such civil
liability provision as appears in earlier acts, i.e., Securities Act, 48 STAT. 82 (1933), as
amended 48 STAT. 907 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 77k (1934) and Holding Company Act, 49
STAT. 829 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79p (Supp. 1939).
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counting regulations, would raise the standards of responsibility in dividend
declaration °
Reorganization of Investment Companics. All of the familiar abuses of
voluntary corporate reorganizations7 appeared in heightened form in the
investment company field, where the stake for which the reorganizers played
was a portfolio of more or less liquid assets, frequently a more desirable
prize than the frozen assets of an industrial company. Almost invariably the
abuses occurred where capital depreciation had wiped out the common stock
equity in ar investment company and left senior security holders in posses-
sion of shares whose market value was much less than actual liquidation
value. Owing to the strategic position of the common stock, the preferi'ed
holders lacked legal power to compel dissolution, and could easily be induced
to exchange their shares for an amount of the acquiring corporation's stock
worth more on the market, but considerably less in terms of underlying
assets, than the shares they gave up. When the acquiring corporation had
exchanged enough stock to give it the statutory percentage for merger or
dissolution, it could, by these processes, realize the full liquidation value of
the stock previously acquired at a discount. There is nothing intrinsically
wrong with such a scheme providing the terms of the exchange offers are
fair and the eventual dissolution of the acquired company is accomplished
fairly. But the record shows that high-pressure salesmanship was employed,
that misrepresentations were made, that the management of the acquired
company (common stockholders) were often in effect bribed to betray the
preferred holders, that the proxy machinery was used unfairly, that the assets
of the acquired company were unfairly valued for dissolution, and that where
there was not actual fraud involved, there was often a disingenuous treat-
ment of minority interests very close to fraud.72 Both state and federal legis-
lation completely failed to affect some of these reorganizations, and in the
rest offered only imperfect protection. 3
70. Adverse publicity in the newspapers resulting from mere notice of an SEC
order to show cause can exert potent pressure through market reaction. Comment, Pub-
licity and the Security Market (1940) 7 U. OF CHicAGo L. RLv. 676.
71. SEC REPoRT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORN, AcrrnsTS, Psn-
SONNEL, AND FucTioNs OF PRomcrva ADREORGANIZATION CoM-417zTS (1938) Pt.
VII, § 4 and Appendix B, passim.
72. SEC REPORT, Pt. III, § 4, p. 393 et seq.
73. The registration and prospectus provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 ordi-
narily are not applicable to reorganizations effected pursuant to typical state statutes.
See note 5 to the Commission's "Rules as to the Use of Form E-1 under the Securities
Act of 1933 for Securities in Reorganization" (1933). C.C.H. Securities Act Service,
p. 1648, 17231 (1937).
The proxy regulations of the Securities and ExMchange Act of 1934 are applicable
only to corporations with securities listed on registered exchanges, which excludes over
70% of all existing investment companies controlling 40% of total investment company
assets. SEC REPoR, Pt. II, c. 4, Table 1.
For the inadequacy of most state statutes to protect minority interests in voluntary
reorganization, see note 72 supra. Furthermore the majority of these statutes fail to
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Against this background the original draft of Section 25, which gave the
Commission veto power over reorganization plans unless they met the bank-
ruptcy standard of being "fair, equitable, and feasible," seemed amply justi-
fied. It would have provided an ideal laboratory experiment in the solution
of a problem common to all corporate fields.
As finally re-drafted, however, Section 25 is almost meaningless, except
for the possibility of the Commission's exercising an extra-statutory authority.
The Section provides for full disclosure of the reorganization plan,74 but
sets no substantive standards and vests no substantive regulatory power in
the Commission. Upon application by the company, or by 25% of any class
of 'security holders, the Commission may issue an "advisory opinion." 5
The Commission may also sue to enjoin plans which are "grossly unfair,"
which in effect provides an alternative and possibly more competent plaintiff
than the representative stockholder."0 The unexpressed threat of such suit,
together with its resulting unfavorable publicity, may not only persuade
companies to apply for an advisory opinion from the Commission, but may
also cause them to accept the Commission's substantive recommendations: in
short, it may establish in practice what the original bill failed to establish
by law.77
Section 11 does for open-end companies essentially what Section 25 does
for the closed-enders. In this field the abuse consisted principally in high-
pressuring investors out of one trust into another organized by the same
promoter for the purpose of imposing new sales and service charges. 78 This
abuse is met by a provision requiring SEC approval of exchange offers
which are made on any other basis than the relative net asset values of the
slares involved. Exchange offers within a company according to some charter
or indenture provision,79 and exchanges requiring a majority class vote are
exempt.
Miscellaneous Provisions. In addition to the more general problems arising
under the sections of the Act hitherto discussed, there are a number of other
cover the case of the Massachusetts business trust, a form of organization accounting




77. Since the passage of this Act (Aug. 22, 1940) the managements of three groups
of investment companies have prepared reorganization plans, and in each case the com-
pany has requested, either formally or informally, the Commission's approval before
submitting it to the stockholders. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Mr.
David Schenker, director of the Investment Companies Division of the SEC.
78. As many as six management companies were promoted by a single security dis-
tributing agency in one year. Hearings, Pt. I, p. 226.
79. The mere fact that a single company has organized several trusts tnder separate
indentures does not bring within this exemption exchanges between them. This would
seem to follow from the definition of "company" in § 2(a) which views every invest-
ment fund in the form of a trust as a distinct "issuer" and "company" for the purposes
of the Act.
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scattered provisions, for the most part directed at particular abuses disclosed
in the SEC investigation, which will seriously affect future investment com-
pany practice.
Section 12 contains a number of these, completely unrelated. The Com-
mission is here empowered to regulate margin purchases, short sales, and
joint trading accounts in which investment companies participate
8 9 It is
apparently not the purpose of the Act to forbid these speculative practices
entirely, provided that the company accurately describes its policy in its
registration statement. 8' Subsection (b), which forbids an open-end company
to distribute its own securities in contravention of SEC rules, is directed
at those companies which have emphasized sales of securities rather than
management by stylizing their portfolios solely from the point of view of
sales-appeal, and by milking the fund in the form of promotional expenses.
s -
Subsection (d) attacks pyramiding of investment companies by forbidding
one company to acquire more than 5%o of the stock of a concentrated invest-
ment company or more than 3%o of an unconcentrated company, percentages
which are harmless in terms of control.8 If, however, a company already
bolds 25%o of another, the Act assumes that this holding represents control
or a minority interest too large to liquidate on the market, and therefore
permits further acquisitions in the interest of eventual amalgamation.8'
One serious weakness of the Act is its failure to provide any limitations
on the compensation of management, or to give the Commission any jurisdic-
tion in this regard. Section 15 deals with part of the problem by requiring
investment advisory contracts, and open-end underwriting contracts to be
in writing, to describe precisely the contractual compensation, to have the
annual approval of directors or stockholders, to be terminable without penalty
on 60 days' notice, and to be non-assignable. Previously, such contracts had
80. § 12(a).
81. This attitude was made explicit by Mr. David Schenker, nov: director of the
Investment Companies Division of the SEC, testifying before the Senate subcommittee.
Hearings, Pt. I, p. 233.
82. SEC REPogr, Pt. II, c. 3, p. 211 ct seq.
83. The original draft of § 12(d) had absolutely forbidden one investment company
to purchase the securities of another. But the industry, while conscious of the danger
of pyramiding, felt that such purchases, purely as investments, were often desirable. The
present section is a good compromise. Cf. Statement on Investment Trusts of the Man-
agement Type by the Committee on Stock Listing of the Arcew York Sloc Exchange
(April 22, 1931). Cross or circular owvnership of investment company voting securities is
completely banned in § 20 as leading to fictitious valuations of the assets of all com-
panies involved.
84. By taking advantage of § 3 [see note 22 supra] it is possible under the present
Act to pyramid investment company control through the medium of industrial com-
panies. Whether this will prove a serious flaw is doubtful. A last-minute attempt to
close the loophole was rejected on the ground that it involved potential regulation of too
many extraneous corporations. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ir.-
terstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on H. R. 10065, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) p. 122-4.
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often been a lucrative part of the promoter's "take" and remained a heavy
burden upon the cpmpany.8 5
After considerable debate in hearings on the bill, a compromise was adopted
with respect to the repurchase of a company's own stock. Under Section
23(c) a closed-end company may purchase on the open market after a six-
month's warning to its stockholders, or pursuant to tenders by an entire
class of stockholders, or under other circumstances approved by an SEC
order.8 6 The complicated problem of distribution and redemption of open-end
company securities is turned over for trial solution for one year under Sec-
tion 22 to a securities association registered under the Maloney Act. 7 After
a year, if the Commission is not satisfied, it is given broad powers to deal
with the problem itself.
Sections 26-29, inclusive, deal in considerable detail with the special
problems of the unit trust, the periodic payment plan company, and the
face-amount certificate company. While these form an important part of
the general investment company picture, they are sufficiently distinct to
require special study. In general, the difficulty with the unit trust is that
of insuring a competent and continuous trusteeship for the "unit" of invests
ments against which shares are issued. With the periodic payment plan
companies, the problem is that which is perennially present in installment
buying-fixing an equitable sales load. And for the face-amount certificate
companies, which promise a fixed sum of money at a stated time, the question
is largely one of maintaining adequate reserves against maturing liabilities.
These problems were handled forthrightly in the Commission's original bill,
which was not significantly altered in the redraft.
88
Conclusion. In so far as the ills of the investment company industry were
confined to the type of mismanagement exposed in the SEC Report, this
Act could justly be termed a complete corrective. It is inconceivable that
any of the old abuses should reappear. Unfortunately, however, it is not so
85. With the exception of the public utility system of companies, the investment com-
pany field is the only one where the institution of management contracts has flourished.
For reasons of economy in small companies it was not possible to legislate them out of
existence. But stockholders are given at least the same amount of control over man-
agerial compensation as over directorial compensation under § 15. Contrast with the
Holding Company Act which requires SEC approval as well. 49 STAT. 825 (1935), 15
U. S. C. §79m (Supp. 1939).
86. While this section adequately protects stockholders from the unfair use of inside
information to discriminate within that class, i.e., by repurchasing only the shares owned
by management affiliates, it is defective in its failure to provide for maintenance of the
equity behind outstanding senior paper. See the suggestions for "sound investment trust
practice" in N. Y. Stock Exchange statement, supra note 83.
87. Such associations are encouraged to take a part in the regulation of the over-
the-counter market analagous to that played by organized stock exchanges in regulating
exchange trading. 52 STAT. 1070 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 (Supp. 1939). Comment
(1938) 48 YALE L. J. 633.
88. Hearings, Pt. IV, pp. 1119 and 1128.
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easy to guarantee protection from bad business judgment as from fraud.
The welfare of the individual investor in investment company securities now
and always depends more upon the ability and integrity of his particular
management than upon any statute.
Nor is this Act alone any guarantee of the welfare of the industry as a
whole. The general problem of the service which the investment companies
perform in the national economy is still open- whether they will undertake
the responsibility of diverting a substantial part of their assets from the
merry-go-round of the established market to the support of new industry;
and, if they do, whether some reduction will be made in the excessive income
tax burden which they now bear.8 9
In offering a partial answer to the first of these questions, Section 12(e)
may turn out to be one of the most important provisions of the whole Act.
It proposes the formation of one or more underwriting corporations, all the
stock of which will be held by investment companies and which will be exempt
from any inconsistent provisions of the Act, to engage in various kinds of
venture capital financing. From an economic point of view the appearance
of even a moderate amount of equity capital seeking investment in new in-
dustries would be extremely encouraging at the present time, and would
doubtless be adequately supported by senior money from the banking sys-
tem.90 From the investment company point of view, such a cooperative scheme
would mitigate the difficulties of illiquidity and supervision which have
hitherto embarrassed the attempts of individual investment companies to
underwrite growing industry.91
The tax problem is outside the scope of the Act, but it would seem that
an investment company subject to the corrective provisions of the Act, fully
distributing its earnings, and performing the socially useful function of
furnishing and supervising venture capital to industry deserved special in-
come tax consideration. 2 If Section 12(e) is successful and a tax adjust-
ment is made, the social health of the industry would seem assured.93
89. See note 14 supra.
90. See Stoddard, Small Business W'ants Capital (1940) 18 HAv. Bus. REv. 265.
91. The notable example is Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., the first, largest, and
eventually least solvent company in this field. Hearings, PL I, p. 228 c seq.
92. Some slight beginning has been made in the establishment of a low tax rate
for so-called "mutual" companies which are very narrowly defined. To qualify, the
companies must be open-end, distribute 90% of their annual income, have a diversified
portfolio, derive no more than a third of their income from in-and-out trading, and bor-
row no more than 10% of their assets. Ixr. REv. CODE §§ 361, 362 as amended by Rev-
enue Act of 1940, §3(d). These "mutual" companies, and also all "diversifed" com-
panies registered under the Investment Company Act, are exempt from the excess profits
tax. SECOND REvmqTJE Acr of 1940, § 201.
93. Editorial, Rounding Out the SEC, Wall St. Journal, Sept. 23, 1938, p. 4, col. 1:
"The proposed regulation of investment trusts by the SEC fills a gap in the supervision
of securities which is needed. The whole idea behind the SEC has been and is, protection
of the small investor; and no phase of finance is so peculiarly reserved to the small
investor as the investment trust."
